

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1959

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Recategorized as Category "A" by C. M. Richardson
12/21/90
/s/ Warren A. Henderson

Dear Foster:

OCT 11 1965

I am attaching for your information a copy of a memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which Mr. Murphy requested be prepared on January 30th. This memorandum outlines certain actions in regard to the Berlin situation which could be initiated and which, while detectible through intelligence channels, would not be of such a nature as to create public alarm. The memorandum from General Twining should not be interpreted as meaning that all of the measures must necessarily be undertaken, but could be used selectively as desired.

This relates not only to the discussion with the President at the meeting on January 29 but also is pertinent to your discussion with Mr. Quarles on January 31.

Sincerely,

John Foster Dulles

Honorable John Foster Dulles

The Secretary of State

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-289-59
2 February 1959

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/s/ Warren A. Hender:

OCT 11 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Situation (U)

1. During the course of the meeting held on Friday, 30 January, between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Murphy requested that a list of actions be compiled appropriate to the developing Berlin situation, which could be initiated promptly and quietly, and which, while detectable through intelligence channels, would not be of a nature to create public alarm.

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2. Attached at the Enclosure is a list of actions believed to be in consonance with the criteria specified, and suitable for discussion with the British and French on Tuesday, 3 February. The list has not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but because of the short time available before Mr. Dulles' departure, I am sending it to you.

3. It is recommended that you provide to the Secretary of State the list of actions contained in the Enclosure.

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N. F. TWINING
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Category "A"

/s/ Warren A. Henderson

ENCLOSURE

OCT 11 1965

MEASURES DISCERNIBLE BY THE SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH WOULD IMPRESS THEM WITH ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND DETERMINATION REGARDING BERLIN WITHOUT CREATING UNDUE PUBLIC ALARM

A. Measures Which Might Be Taken Now

1. Attain agreement [among the Western Occupying Powers] on principles which will guide [their] reaction to Communist harassment of their rights of access to Berlin. (b)(1) CSD

2. Obtain support of West Germany and other NATO Powers [for tripartitely agreed position.] (b)(1) CSD

3. At the individual national level take quiet but unconcealed steps to ready selected national forces to participate in military actions which could conceivably be required later in regard to Berlin.

4. Without augmenting present forces or weapons, demonstrate increased readiness and alertness in the vicinity of Berlin by measures such as:

a. Having MP detachments on Autobahn and sentries at checkpoints in Helmstedt and Berlin in greater evidence, i.e., standing at the barriers instead of sitting at desks inside buildings and leaving the supervision of passage of vehicles to West Germans and Berlin police; (b)(1) STATE

b. Intensifying testing of two-way communications in the handling of simulated forced stoppages of military vehicles;

c. Preparing and conducting command post exercises which will simulate rapid reaction of Allied military forces to enforced convoy stoppage in the Berlin corridor.]

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5. Increase the volume [of military traffic using normal communications procedures between Allied military authorities in West Berlin and their headquarters elsewhere. An increase in the number of discussions on stockpiling programs with West Berlin and West German officials] would also probably become evident to the Communists.

6. Review adequacy and timeliness of plans to meet emergency situation in Berlin; i.e., air contingency plans, air lift plans, evacuation plans, and plans for use of limited military force on the ground including command arrangements. The review of plans would probably be learned [by the Communists only when it reached lower echelons in Europe,] but should be carried out in any event to increase readiness.

7. Initiate public information programs designed to:

- a. Convince world opinion of the legal and moral propriety of the [Tripartite position in Berlin; (b)(1) CSD]
- b. Impress Soviet leaders with Allied solidarity and determination to meet the Berlin situation with firmness;
- c. Expose the [falsity and aggressiveness of the] Soviet position.

B. Measures Which Might Be Taken from Now until the Time at Which East Germany Assumes Control over Access to Berlin

1. Continue, and as appropriate, take other steps along the lines suggested in A 4 above, such as:

- a. Sending wreckers more frequently by pre-arrangement or on radio call to vehicles in the Berlin corridor.
- b. Without enlarging patrol units, increasing the frequency of [Allied] patrols [along the East Germany border and intensifying patrol reporting by two-way voice radio.]

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2. Initiate various isolated military preparedness activities, which, in the Soviet mind, could be associated with the Berlin situation, for example:

a. Re-activating vehicles in dead storage at Livorno, Italy;

b. Exercising engineer units in bridge building and repair on

rivers forward of the Rhine.

3. Through covert channels give impression to Soviet Union that the Western Occupying Powers, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other NATO Allies are reviewing defense plans and studying methods of facilitating their execution, should this become necessary.

4. Discreetly permit the Soviet Union to gain impression that lift is earmarked and ready to evacuate non-combatants from West Berlin.

5. Through appropriate channels indicate to Soviet and East German authorities that Western civil air carriers have been assured that the Western Occupying Powers will not permit any interference with their rightful use of the air corridors to Berlin.

6. Take selected steps preparatory to instituting a NATO or Tripartite state of military vigilance, should it eventually become necessary. These steps might include:

- a. Authorizing commanders periodically to minimize communications;
- b. Intensifying intelligence collection;
- c. Checking alert procedures.

C. Measures Which Might Be Taken At Time East Germany Assumes Control of Access To Berlin

1. Reiterate Tripartite determination to maintain legal position in Berlin and not to tolerate interference with rightful access thereto.

2. If unacceptable restrictions at checkpoints are actually put into effect by the East Germans, deliver formal protests to Soviet Union and bring situation to the attention of the United Nations Organization.

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3. Through appropriate channels permit Soviet Union to understand that Tripartite military commanders have been apprised of seriousness of the situation, and have been directed to complete contingency plans for meeting interference with Tripartite access to Berlin, whether on the ground or in the air.

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